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Abstract 
 
This study investigated the relationship between corporate efficiency and corporate sustainability to 
determine whether firms concerned about environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues can also 
be efficient and profitable. We applied data envelopment analysis to estimate corporate efficiency and 
investigated the nonlinear relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG disclosure. Evidence 
shows that corporate transparency regarding ESG information has a positive association with corporate 
efficiency at the moderate disclosure level, rather than at the high or low disclosure level. Governance 
information disclosure has the strongest positive linkage with corporate efficiency, followed by social 
and environmental information disclosure. Moreover, we explored the relationship between particular 
ESG activities and corporate financial performance (CFP), including corporate efficiency, return on 
assets and market value. We found that most of the ESG activities reveal a non-negative relationship 
with CFP. These findings may provide evidence about voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
strategy choices for enhancing corporate sustainability. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Efficiency, Data Envelopment Analysis, ESG Disclosure, ESG Activities, 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Stakeholder Engagement, Sustainable Development   
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1. Introduction 
In the past several decades, a profound trend has begun to emerge in corporate sustainability, from 
voluntary engagement in sustainable activities to de facto requirements due to both social expectations 
and regulatory pressure (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012). The number of firms that employ sustainability 
strategies and disclose environmental, social and governance (ESG) information continues to increase, 
which has caused fundamental changes to occur in business models and management theory. 
Conventional shareholder-oriented management (Friedman, 1970) aims to enhance financial 
performance and maximize the benefits of shareholders. In contrast, sustainable business promotes 
stakeholder-oriented management (Freeman and McVea, 2001), which takes all the stakeholders, 
including shareholders, consumers, customers, communities and other related groups, into 
consideration and focuses on reducing externalities and maximizing social value regarding ESG issues.  
To date, a large amount of empirical literature has examined the relationship between corporate 
financial performance (CFP) and corporate sustainability to identify the implications of stakeholder-
oriented management for CFP (Brower and Rowe, 2017; Deng et al., 2013; Garcia et al., 2017; John, 
1992; Margolis et al., 2009; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Wang and Sarkis, 2017). Regarding this relationship, 
two views prevail in the literature. On the one hand, according to the Porter hypotheses (Ambec et al., 
2013; Porter and Linde, 1995), corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, especially 
environmental activities, are a source of innovation that creates extra revenue that can cover the 
additional costs, so an appropriate CSR strategy can be positively related to CFP. The majority of 
empirical studies show a positive linkage between CFP and CSR (Deng et al., 2013; John, 1992; 
Margolis et al., 2009; Orlitzky et al., 2003). On the other hand, CSR activities bring additional costs 
caused by agency problems and inefficient resource allocation, which will put the firm at an 
unfavorable position in the free and competitive market (Friedman, 1970; Sternberg, 1997). A 
summary of empirical studies found that negative relationships also exist between corporate social 
performance and financial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). In addition to positive and 
negative relationships, a neutral relationship has also been found between CFP and CSR (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2001; Moore, 2001).  
The uncertainty in the findings leaves unresolved questions. The reasons for the failure to reach a 
consensus regarding the implications of CSR for CFP are related to several aspects. First, the wide 
range of CFP metrics makes it difficult to determine a general relationship regarding this issue. Market-
based metrics are the most frequently applied approaches (Peloza, 2009), which include share price, 
mutual fund returns, and market value (Fatemi et al., 2016). Corporate financial performance is widely 
assessed by accounting-based metrics, such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
(Ferrell et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2016). Choosing the appropriate mechanism to meaningfully support 
corporate decision-making and policy analysis can be problematic. The frequently used single metric 
fails to capture potential CSR implications. 
Second, a variety of CSR concepts and categories complicate drawing conclusions about the CSR-
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CFP relationship. CSR is a multidimensional construct (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Firms have 
different motivations for practicing CSR strategies and use a wide range of resources, which lead to 
different CFP implications. Studies that focus on different types of CSR activities may reach different 
conclusions about the CSR-CFP relationship. 
Third, as Barnett and Salomon (2006) have noted, the relationship between CFP and CSR is neither 
strictly positive nor strictly negative. There may have been problems with the previous studies on this 
issue that simply concluded a linear relationship between CFP and CSR. Studies that have found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between CFP and corporate environmental performance also provide 
evidence for the nonlinear relationship (Fujii et al., 2013; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017). 
In this study, we classified CSR strategy into two categories, ESG information disclosures and ESG 
activities, such as green building policy, equal opportunity policy and independent directors. We used 
a relatively large sample that covers major countries worldwide and 11 sectors from the Bloomberg 
ESG database. We attempt to determine how ESG information transparency is related to corporate 
efficiency, whether the disclosure level has different effects on corporate efficiency, and which types 
of activities would have a positive effect on CFP. 
We have contributed to the existing literature in three aspects. First, we used corporate efficiency as 
an indicator of CFP to avoid the problem of a single metric. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) allows 
us to estimate corporate efficiency by considering all the productive factors. Not only revenue and 
assets, which are the frequently used CFP metrics, but also labor and the cost of goods sold are included 
in the DEA model. This comprehensive evaluation of CFP includes more possible CSR implications 
than a single metric. 
Second, the nonlinear relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG disclosure was 
investigated by nonparametric regression and piecewise linear regression analysis. We found that a 
moderate disclosure level is positively related to corporate efficiency, rather than a high or low 
disclosure level. 
Third, we applied the same pattern of analysis to the components of environmental, social and 
governance issues. We compared the three main aspects of corporate sustainability in terms of the 
differences in both information disclosure and activities and found that governance disclosure has the 
strongest positive effect on corporate efficiency. We tested the effect of 26 ESG activities, including 
11 environmental activities, 6 social activities and 9 governance activities, on corporate efficiency. 
Moreover, a comparison with ROA and market value was used to test the consistency of the corporate 
efficiency indicator.  
Figure 1 shows the research framework of this study. The research design involves two steps. In the 
first step, we estimated corporate efficiency by using the DEA model, with revenue as output and fixed 
assets, numbers of employees and cost of goods sold (COGS) as inputs. In the second step, we 
attempted to clarify the CSR-CFP relationship. First, the nonlinear relationship between corporate 
efficiency and ESG disclosure was investigated. Then, we explored which types of activities would 
have a positive effect on corporate efficiency, ROA and market value. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature on the relationship of 
CFP with ESG disclosures and activities. Based on the previous studies, we propose several hypotheses 
about ESG. Section 3 explains the methodology, including the DEA model and nonparametric and 
parametric regression models. Section 4 describes the sample and the variables used in this study. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results and discussion. Finally, we conclude in section 6. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Corporate financial performance and ESG disclosure 
Several theories explain the reasons why firms voluntarily disclose ESG information. First, the 
legitimacy theory perspective argues that ESG disclosure is aimed at gaining social legitimacy for 
environmental or social impacts caused by the firm’s operation. A firm’s ESG legitimacy is a strong 
motive for ESG disclosure (Lokuwaduge and Heenetigala, 2017). Furthermore, under the pressure of 
social media and the attention of stakeholders, ESG disclosure is a tool for impression management 
that can maintain and enhance corporate reputation (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Higginson et al., 
2006; Patten, 1992). Second, information asymmetry between firm managers and outside investors is 
another motivation for voluntary corporate disclosure (Shane et al., 1983). The lemon problem arises 
from information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Investors will undervalue good 
performing companies and overvalue bad performing companies based on the limited information. 
Thus, the capital market will fail to optimally allocate resources. One solution for the lemon problem 
is to send reliable signals to the market to diminish the information asymmetry between managers and 
outside investors. Socially responsible investment (SRI) has increased dramatically worldwide in the 
past decades. Investors with intrinsic social preferences are more likely to hold socially responsible 
funds, rather than conventional funds of higher financial performance (Riedl and Smeets, 2017). Thus, 
corporations have become more prone to disclosing ESG information. Third, corporate information 
disclosure is a discretionary-based disclosure, which reflects managerial discretion regarding how 
much information managers choose to disclose (Verrecchia, 1990, 2001). There is a tradeoff faced by 
managers regarding to what extent they should disclose corporate information, favorable or 
unfavorable, to value the firm in a rational market. Firms (the seller) prefer to disclose favorable 
information and withhold unfavorable information to enhance their evaluation in the market. On the 
other hand, outside investors (the buyer) discount the firm’s value by considering the undisclosed 
information as unfavorable information. This compels firms to reveal more information even though 
it may be unfavorable.  
As the theories above explain, ESG disclosure may bring firms a competitive advantage in a rational 
market. However, previous empirical studies have found a mixed relationship between CFP and ESG 
disclosure. Aerts et al. (2008) found that more environmental disclosure could be translated to precise 
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earnings forecasts by analysts, which implies that improved environmental disclosure is positively 
related to CFP. Clarkson et al. (2011) found that environmental disclosure improved CFP in polluting 
industries in the United States. In addition to environmental disclosure, governance disclosure also 
benefits the principal. Larger firms that introduce more stringent disclosure regimes will employ more 
capable managers, which leads to better financial performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). 
Corporations that publish an ESG report have a higher stock market return (Weber, 2014). Higher ESG 
transparency boosts firm value (Yu et al., 2018), and integrated ESG reporting leads to a higher market 
valuation than stand-alone reporting (Mervelskemper and Streit, 2017). Conversely, Qiu et al. (2016) 
did not find any relation between environmental disclosure and CFP but found that social disclosure 
was positively related to CFP. However, negative relationships have also been found between 
information disclosure and CFP (Lorraine et al., 2004; Santos and Escanciano, 2002). 
Against this backdrop, even though mixed relationships exist, it is important to note that previous 
studies have seldom investigated the nonlinear relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG 
disclosure. They also failed to consider the three types of disclosures together to compare the 
differences among them. One exception is the study by Nollet et al. (2016). They argued that ESG 
disclosure possessed a quadratic relationship with CFP and found a U-shaped relationship between 
governance disclosure and CFP. Consistent with this finding, we further investigate how corporate 
efficiency is related to ESG disclosure and distinguish the relationships at different disclosure levels. 
As such, we hypothesize the following. 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Corporate efficiency presents a nonlinear relationship with overall ESG disclosure, 
and a positive relationship exists at a certain disclosure level. 
Hypothesis 1b. Corporate efficiency has a nonlinear relationship with the environmental, social and 
governance components of disclosures. Among the three components of ESG disclosure, governance 
disclosure has the strongest effect on corporate efficiency. 
 
2.2 Corporate financial performance and ESG activities 
ESG activities include both managerial discretion and compulsory obligations. The relationship 
between CFP and CSR strategy choices has been extensively discussed in previous studies. In terms 
of environmental activities, the traditional view argues that environmental regulations are an additional 
cost to the company that reduce profitability and lead to low efficiency. Conversely, the Porter 
hypothesis argues that stringent, but flexible, environmental regulation may stimulate companies to 
innovate technologically or managerially. These innovations create efficiencies that offset the 
additional costs and, in the future, generate more revenue. However, whether environmental 
regulations can stimulate additional revenue that exceeds the additional cost and lead to higher 
corporate efficiency remains to be determined (Ambec et al., 2013). Another concern is that firms may 
also symbolically conform to environmental policies without actual efforts to pursue the environmental 
goals (Haque and Ntim, 2018). Empirically, adopting stringent global environmental standards will 
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lead to much higher market value compared to less stringent regulations (Dowell et al., 2000). In a 
high growth industry, positive links between environmental performance and profitability will be 
strengthened (Michael and Paul, 1997). According to the previous studies discussed above, we propose 
that only policies that cut costs or bring extra revenue will be positively related to corporate efficiency. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Environmental activities that are cost cutting are positively related to corporate 
efficiency. 
 
In terms of social activities, good corporate social performance, such as corporate charitable giving, 
will have a positive effect on financial performance in the long run (Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
Moreover, these long-term benefits could be stronger in the sectors that depend more on reputation, 
brands and large quantities of natural resources (Eccles et al., 2014). However, social activities bring 
the same concerns regarding additional costs as environmental activities. Thus, we propose hypothesis 
3. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Social activities that enhance corporate reputation and attract capable employees with 
little additional cost are positively related to corporate efficiency. 
 
In terms of governance activities, many studies explored the relationship between board structure 
and CFP. Positive relationships were found for several aspects. In the case of independent directors, 
Luan and Tang (2007) found that having an independent director has a significantly positive impact on 
a firm's performance. Zhu et al. (2016) found that, in China, empowering independent directors is 
positively associated with firm value. Regarding the issue of women on the board, many studies found 
that board gender diversity may improve CFP (Erhardt et al., 2003; Hoobler et al., 2016; Terjesen et 
al., 2016; Wang, 2012). In certain industries, such as the banking industry, good corporate governance 
also has a positive effect on CFP (Esteban-Sanchez et al., 2017). Following the previous studies, we 
further added global sustainable governance principles as a factor in our analytical model to investigate 
how governance activities are linked with corporate efficiency. We propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Governance activities that involve an independent and diversified board of directors 
are positively related to corporate efficiency.  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Estimation of Corporate Efficiency  
To estimate corporate efficiency, we applied DEA, a multivariable estimation method widely used 
to evaluate the efficiency of companies and utilities. We applied the input oriented model (Banker et 
al., 1984) by minimizing inputs and maintaining the output at its current level, as shown in equation 
(1), where 𝑥𝑖 denotes inputs, including COGS, net fixed assets and number of employees, and 𝑦𝑟 
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denotes the output, the revenue. 
𝜃∗ = min 𝜃   𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝜃𝑥𝑖0, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑚;
𝑛
𝑗=1   
∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑦𝑟𝑗 ≥ 𝑦𝑟0, 𝑟 = 1,2, … , 𝑠;
𝑛
𝑗=1                                        (1) 
∑ 𝜆𝑗 = 1 
𝑛
𝑗=1   
𝜆𝑗 ≥ 0,    𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛;  
In equation (1), ∑ 𝜆𝑗 = 1
𝑛
𝑗=1   indicates the variable returns to scale feature. 𝜃
∗  is the input 
oriented efficiency of each decision-making unit and ranges from 0 to 1. If 𝜃∗ = 1, then the input 
cannot be reduced, which implies that the company’s performance is at the optimal level. If 𝜃∗ < 1, 
then the input should be reduced by 𝜃∗ to become efficient, which indicates that the firm is less 
efficient than its peers.  
 
3.2 Regression Model 
Based on the corporate efficiency score estimated by the DEA model above, we specified three 
regression models to investigate the relationship between corporate efficiency and corporate 
sustainability strategies. 
First, we used nonparametric regression to investigate the relationship between corporate efficiency 
and the ESG disclosure score. In the regression model, Effi is the corporate efficiency and xi is 
disclosure score, which includes the overall ESG disclosure score and the components E, S, and G of 
the disclosure score, as shown in equation (2). The Epanechnikov kernel estimator was used to smooth 
the regression result.  
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖 = 𝑚(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁                                       (2) 
Second, to validate the nonparametric regression result and examine to what degree the ESG 
disclosure scores are related to corporate efficiency, we further divided the ESG disclosure score into 
quarters (low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high disclosure levels) to test the slope of each interval 
by using piecewise linear regression. Xi represents the firm characteristics. 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                                (3) 
Third, ordinary least square regression was applied to investigate the relationship of corporate 
efficiency with environmental, social and governance activities. The coefficients βi explain how 
corporate efficiency is related to ESG activities. 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                                      (4) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                                     (5) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                                 (6) 
We mainly investigated how corporate efficiency is related to ESG activities. Furthermore, we also 
specified models by using ROA and market value as dependent variables. ROA is calculated from 
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earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), interest expenditure, tax expenditure and total assets. We 
used Tobin’s Q (total market value divided by total assets) as the indicator of market value and took 
the natural logarithm value to eliminate the effect of outliers (Aouadi and Marsat, 2016; Jo and Harjoto, 
2011). Xi represents the control variables. We added sector and country dummy variables to control for 
both sector and country features. Liang and Renneboog (2017) have noted that CSR practices vary 
significantly across countries, according to different legal origins that play an important role in driving 
financial and economic outcomes. We also controlled for R&D expenditures, firm size and financial 
risk. Larger firms may take advantage of economies of scale to enhance revenue and market value. We 
used the value of the natural logarithm of the number of employees as the indicator of firm size. Firms 
are vulnerable to financial burden. Firms with high financial leverage are more likely to lose market 
share and experience a negative effect on profitability and market value (Opler and Titman, 2009). To 
control for financial risk, we used the natural logarithm value of financial leverage (total liability 
divided by equity) to indicate financial risk. 
4. Data 
We used the Bloomberg Environmental, Social and Governance Database, which offers both the 
financial data and ESG information of global companies. Bloomberg Professional Service provides 
the ESG information collected from firms’ annual reports, sustainability reports, press releases and 
third-party research and covers information on board structure, such as the percentage of women on 
the board and independent directors. The transparency of ESG information is indicated by the index 
called the ESG disclosure score, in which every data point is weighted in terms of importance and 
tailored to different industry sectors. The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score ranges from 0.1, which 
indicates the lowest disclosure level, to 100, for firms that disclose every data point collected by 
Bloomberg (Siew, 2015).  
We gathered financial data and ESG information, including the overall ESG disclosure score, 
components of environmental, social and governance disclosure scores and ESG activity-related data 
of global companies. This study consisted of two steps: The first step involved estimating the corporate 
efficiency for each firm by using financial data. The second step involved analyzing the relationship 
between corporate efficiency and ESG disclosure as well as ESG activities. 
In the first step, the financial data of 6631 companies in 2015 from 74 countries1 and 11 sectors 
were used to estimate the corporate efficiency for each firm. We used revenue as the output. In terms 
of inputs, COGS, net fixed assets and number of employees were used as inputs to estimate corporate 
efficiency. Given the features of the different sectors, corporate efficiency was calculated by sector. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all the observations. The descriptive statistics for each 
sector are shown in Appendix Table S1.  
                                                     
1 Most observations come from the top three economies, the United States (2030 obs.), China (1042 obs.) and Japan 
(1908 obs.). Among the remaining observations, European countries account for a large proportion. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In the second step of the regression analysis, we used the ESG disclosure score, components of 
environmental, social and governance disclosure scores and ESG activity-related data to analyze their 
relationship with corporate efficiency. As shown in Table 1, the average governance disclosure score 
(G score) is higher than both the environmental disclosure score (E score) and the social disclosure 
score (S score). ESG-related activities consisted of ESG policies and initiatives. We gathered 26 ESG 
activities, including 11 environmental activities, 6 social activities and 9 governance activities. The 
variables illustrating whether the firm implemented the related policies or initiatives are all dummy 
variables, for which 0 indicates that the firm does not practice the activity and 1 indicates that the firm 
does perform the activity. For governance activities, we also collected information regarding the 
percentage of women on the board, independent directors, CEO duality and audit committee meetings. 
The descriptions for all ESG activities are listed in Table 2. Based on the sample for corporate 
efficiency estimation, we selected observations by dropping the missing values for each regression 
model. The sample size varies as the model changes. For detailed descriptive statistics for all ESG 
activity variables, see Appendix Table S2, S3 and S4. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5. Results and discussions 
5.1 Corporate efficiency 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the efficiency scores in each sector. The distribution of the entire 
sample shows a trend that the number of companies decreases as the efficiency score increases, except 
for the companies with extremely low efficiency. The corporate efficiency distribution of materials is 
close to a normal distribution, where there are many medium-level efficiency companies, while the 
numbers of companies decrease as the efficiency score becomes closer to 0 or 1. The industrial, 
consumer discretionary, consumer staple, health care and information technology sectors present 
similar right-skewed distributions, where most of the companies are concentrated in the low efficiency 
score interval. Conversely, the numbers of high efficiency companies in the financial, utilities and real 
estate sectors are much higher than those of companies with medium and low efficiency scores. The 
energy and telecommunication services have similar distributions, where firms with high and medium 
efficiency scores dominate the sector.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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5.2 Corporate efficiency and ESG disclosure 
The relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG disclosure was investigated, as illustrated 
in Figure 3. Assuming that there is no linear relationship between them, we used nonparametric 
regression analysis to explore the relationship between corporate efficiency and disclosure score. As 
shown in Figure 3 (a), we found a positive relationship between corporate efficiency and the overall 
ESG score at the middle disclosure level, a strong negative relationship at the high disclosure level and 
a weak negative relationship at the low disclosure level. Figure 3 (b) shows that the E score also has 
a mixed relationship with corporate efficiency. At the low and middle disclosure levels, the E score 
presents an ascending trend with corporate efficiency. When the E score is greater than 75 points, 
corporate efficiency tends to decrease as the E score increases. For the S score, we found a weak 
negative relationship at the low disclosure level (Figure 3 (c)), similar to that for the ESG score. There 
is also a negative trend at the high disclosure level, but it is not reliable because of the wide confidence 
interval. As shown in Figure 3 (d), the G score first shows a negative relationship with corporate 
efficiency. At the middle disclosure level, the positive relationship between the G score and corporate 
efficiency is the strongest among all three types of disclosures. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
We further used piecewise linear regression to validate the relationship between corporate efficiency 
and ESG disclosure. The disclosure score was divided into quarters to test the strength of the 
relationship, where the low disclosure level is from 0 to 25 points, the lower-middle disclosure level 
is from 25 to 50 points, the upper-middle disclosure level is from 50 to 75 points and the high disclosure 
level is from 75 to 100 points. Moreover, the change of slope was tested by the coefficient equality test 
to distinguish the relationship at different disclosure levels. The results were consistent with the 
nonparametric regression analysis. 
As shown in Table 3, the overall ESG score is negatively related to corporate efficiency when the 
ESG score is lower than 25 points. At the lower-middle disclosure level, the ESG score has a significant 
and positive effect on corporate efficiency. At the upper-middle disclosure level, the relationship 
becomes negative again but is not significant, while at the high disclosure level, corporate efficiency 
shows a significantly negative association with the ESG score. The nonlinear relationship implies that 
the degree of ESG information transparency results in different corporate efficiency effects. The 
information asymmetry problem may be associated with the low disclosure level. However, a high 
disclosure level may bring additional costs and more limitations for corporate operations. As a result, 
neither the low nor the high ESG information disclosure level has positive effects on corporate 
efficiency. In this case, only the moderate disclosure level has a positive effect on corporate efficiency. 
As for the components of the ESG score, different trends are found for the different types of 
disclosures. In terms of the E score, at both the low and lower-middle disclosure levels, there is a 
significant and positive relationship between corporate efficiency and E score. However, the E score 
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is negatively related to corporate efficiency at the high disclosure level, and there is no significant 
association at the upper-middle disclosure level, which is the same trend seen with the overall ESG 
score. For the S score, the results at the low and middle disclosure levels are similar to those for the 
overall ESG score, i.e., there is a weak negative relationship at the low disclosure level and a positive 
relationship at the lower-middle disclosure level. However, we did not observe a significant 
relationship at either the high disclosure level or the upper-middle disclosure level. Since there are no 
observations at the high disclosure level for the G score, we only observed the results of the G score 
at low and middle disclosure levels. First, the G score presents a strong negative relationship with 
corporate efficiency at the low disclosure level. Then, the relationship becomes positive at the lower-
middle disclosure level. At the upper-middle disclosure level, we observed a much stronger positive 
relationship for the G score, with the highest coefficient among all three types of disclosures. 
Furthermore, the coefficient equality test indicates that the two positive coefficients of the ascending 
trend are significantly different. Among all three disclosure types, either for positive or negative 
relationships, the G score has the strongest effect on corporate efficiency compared with the E and S 
scores. One possible explanation may be that governance information is more tightly related to 
corporate operations. Moreover, according to the research by Eccles et al. (2011), the global interest 
in governance information is greater than that in environmental and social information. 
Overall, at different disclosure levels, mixed relationships exist between ESG disclosure and 
corporate efficiency. Meanwhile, common features can also be found through the comparison. First, a 
low disclosure level presents a negative relationship with corporate efficiency. A lack of disclosure 
brings about information asymmetry, which puts firms at a disadvantaged position in a rational market. 
One exception is environmental disclosure. Since the market is paying increasing attention to 
environmental problems, firms are encouraged to disclose environmental information, which was 
seldom done in the past. Even a low environmental information disclosure level enhances corporate 
reputation, which is associated with higher efficiency. Second, a high disclosure level also has a 
negative effect on corporate efficiency, as observed from the overall ESG score and the E score. 
Although environmental information disclosure is encouraged, a high disclosure level will expose 
much more unfavorable information. When a firm attempts to maintain a high disclosure level and 
good environmental performance in the long term, negative signals will destroy the corporate 
reputation. Corporate efficiency may also be affected by the additional cost of maintaining a high 
disclosure level. The third common feature is that for all types of disclosure, positive relationships are 
observed at the lower-middle disclosure level. Among these relationships, the coefficient of the G score 
is the highest, followed by the S and E scores. These results are consistent with the nonparametric 
regression analysis and prove our hypothesis that a positive relationship between ESG disclosures 
exists at certain disclosure levels. As shown in Table 3, this disclosure level is between 25 and 50 
points. However, at the upper-middle disclosure level, only the G score has a significant and positive 
effect on corporate efficiency. The other types of disclosure have no significant relationship with 
corporate efficiency. At this disclosure level, the disadvantage of withholding information may be 
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offset by the benefit of disclosing information, especially for environmental and social information. 
Governance information still has a positive effect on corporate efficiency and is the strongest factor 
for companies at the upper-middle disclosure level, which implies that the importance of operation-
related governance information is greater than that of environmental and social information. Based on 
these results, we conclude that our results support hypothesis 1(a) and hypothesis 1(b) regarding the 
nonlinear relationship and the strongest effect from governance disclosure.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.3 Corporate efficiency and ESG activities 
Firms that adopt aggressive CSR strategies outperform their peers for several reasons, such as higher 
corporate reputation and favorable working conditions that attract productive employees (Turban and 
Greening, 1997) or enhanced competitiveness. In this section, we attempted to find the relationship 
between corporate efficiency and ESG activities. Through comparison with the results of ROA and 
market value, we also investigated the relationship between ESG activities and other financial 
performance indicators from the perspective of profitability and market expectation. 
 
Environmental Activities 
As shown in Table 4, we found that the verification type is significantly and positively related to 
corporate efficiency and market value, implying that companies with their environmental policies 
subject to an independent assessment tend to be more efficient and highly evaluated. The intense 
market competition encourages firms to employ more strategic environmental policies to enhance 
competitiveness. Since environmental policies have controversial impacts on CFP, the third-party 
assessment of environmental policy plays an important role in ensuring the policy’s effectiveness and 
efficiency. This result implies the necessity of an independent assessment for corporate environmental 
policies. 
We also observed that a green building policy is positively associated with both corporate efficiency 
and ROA. The efficiency score of firms that employed a green building policy is 0.036 higher than the 
score of firms that did not. Similarly, ROA is also higher if a firm takes steps towards using 
environmental technologies or principles in the design and construction of its buildings. In a typical 
office building, 30 percent of operating expense comes from energy consumption; it is the largest and 
most manageable operating expense in the provision of office space (Eichholtz et al., 2010). In the past 
decades, the economic return of having more energy-efficient and sustainable properties has stimulated 
the real estate market. Significant benefits are obtained by using green building properties, which 
include energy conservation, and meeting the shifting preferences of both tenants and investors with 
respect to environmental issues (Eichholtz et al., 2013). Furthermore, firms offering more updated and 
environmentally friendly office space are more likely to attract a better work force (Turban and 
Greening, 1997). This may also result in higher efficiency and profitability.  
14 
 
The results reveal a significant and negative relationship between corporate efficiency and 
environmental quality management policy as well as market value. Implementing a comprehensive 
environmental quality management strategy does not come without costs, such as prevention costs 
(costs of training employees), appraisal costs (costs of monitoring equipment), internal failure costs 
(costs of separating wastes) and external failure costs (costs of addressing hazardous emissions) 
(Chandrashekar et al., 1999). When adopting an environmental quality management policy, firms will 
also be impeded by the costs of shifting supply chain relationships and coping with moral problems 
(Miles and Russell, 1997). This is more likely to result in a negative relationship with corporate 
efficiency and profitability. The challenge is how to adopt an environmental quality management 
system more smoothly and enhance the efficiency of environmental quality management 
implementation. However, as one essential strategy of an environmental quality management policy, 
environmental supply chain management is positively related to corporate efficiency. Many studies 
have also found a positive link between corporate financial performance and green supply chains. As 
Rao and Holt (2005) explained, a green supply chain could be a source of competitiveness, which can 
improve corporate efficiency. Unlike green building policy, sustainable packaging is not significantly 
related to corporate efficiency, but firms that choose to use sustainable packaging are more likely to 
have higher ROA and market value. 
Activities such as emissions reduction initiatives, climate change policy and discussion of climate 
change opportunities and risks and new products related to climate change and energy efficiency policy 
have no significant relationship with corporate efficiency, ROA or market value. From the point of 
view of stakeholder theory, the climate change issue is related to the largest number of stakeholders. 
However, in terms of the climate change issue, doing good does not mean doing well. Activities related 
to climate change are much less effective than activities that focus on corporate operational problems, 
such as a green building policy and a green supply chain. Henderson (2015) argued that for profit-
maximizing firms, if the sustainable activities simply contribute to a public good, such as a climate 
change policy, this will put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. Although our result does not show 
a negative relationship, it indicates that firms with climate change policies are neither more nor less 
efficient. 
According to the discussion above, as explained by the Porter hypothesis, environmental activities 
that present a positive association with CFP have some common features. Not all environmental 
policies will improve performance. This improvement occurs only if the policy aims to enhance 
environmental performance with any potential profit higher than the additional cost (Porter and Linde, 
1995). In other words, our results support hypothesis 2, which states that activities that are cost cutting 
are positively related to corporate efficiency.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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Social Activities 
As revealed in Table 5, equal opportunity and training policies are both positively associated with 
corporate efficiency and market value. Regarding corporate efficiency, the efficiency scores of firms 
with equal opportunity policies are 0.043 greater than those of other firms. The efficiency scores of 
firms that practice training programs are 0.048 greater than those of firms that do not. The results are 
consistent with an experiment-based study indicating that trained workers performed better than 
workers who did not participate in training programs (De Grip and Sauermann, 2012). Companies that 
adopt policies concerning employee career development and that offer equal work conditions may 
enhance their corporate reputation and attract more productive employees (Turban and Greening, 
1997). Furthermore, many researchers have investigated the effect of on-the-job-training on 
productivity and have found a positive relationship between training programs and employee 
productivity (De Grip and Sauermann, 2013; Konings and Vanormelingen, 2015), which is also 
supported by our results.  
In addition to equal opportunity and training policies, a human rights policy also has a positive 
relationship with market value, with a coefficient of 0.064, which is higher than that for the equal 
opportunity and training policies. A human rights policy aims to ensure the protection of the rights of 
all people involved with a company. Even though the benefits are not reflected by corporate efficiency 
and ROA, the market value reveals a positive relationship with this policy. While a policy that does 
not focus on operations but aims to create a more ideal corporate culture may have little connection 
with efficiency and profitability, such a policy would be well evaluated by the market. This is because 
it enhances corporate reputation and may indirectly lead to a better workplace. 
As with environmental activities, social activities present controversial relationships with CFP. 
Practicing social activities involves costs; adopting a policy where the additional costs cannot be 
covered by the benefits may reduce profits and efficiency. As noted in Table 5, corporate efficiency is 
negatively related to having a health and safety policy. Moreover, employee CSR training does not 
have a positive relationship with CFP. These controversial results support hypothesis 3, which states 
that social activities that can enhance corporate reputation and attract able employees with little 
additional costs are positively related to corporate efficiency. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Governance Activities 
Governance activities consist of both stakeholder- and shareholder-oriented management strategies. 
As shown in Table 6, among the investigated global standard corporate governance regulations, 
including the United Nations Global Compact Signatory, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Criteria 
Compliance and Global Reporting Initiatives Checked, we found that only the United Nations Global 
Compact Signatory is positively related to corporate efficiency. Participants of the United Nations 
Global Compact are requested to practice ten principles covering four aspects of human rights, labor, 
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environment and anti-corruption. Most aspects of the ten principles and ESG activities overlap, such 
as human rights and equal opportunity policies and activities concerning environmental issues. Among 
these, a majority of the activities show non-negative relationships with corporate efficiency. 
Consistently, the relationship between the United Nations Global Compact Signatory and corporate 
efficiency is also significant and positive. 
As for the other two global standards, no significant result is found with either corporate efficiency 
or market value. Regarding the GRI Criteria Compliance, companies are required to publish a 
sustainability report to enhance ESG management and decision-making. This type of nonfinancial 
reporting may target long-term management strategy and business plans, which is not reflected in our 
research. According to the results, the nonsignificant relationship implies that sustainability reporting 
has little linkage with financial performance. However, the negative relationship between GRI Criteria 
Compliance and ROA implies an obstacle to promoting sustainability reporting in the short run. 
In terms of board composition, Table 6 reveals that board independence has the strongest positive 
relationship with corporate efficiency and presents a significantly positive relationship with market 
value as well. From the perspective of shareholder theory, boards of directors take on the responsibility 
to solve agency problems. In large organizations, the CEO has incentives to keep his job and increase 
his own benefits from the position, which may harm the interests of shareholders. The negative 
relationship between executive compensation linked to ESG and ROA indicates the concern about the 
agency problem. Compensation related to nonfinancial objectives may lead to the CEO increasing his 
own benefits rather than enhancing the value of shareholders. Thus, there is an endogenous 
requirement of the board of directors to bargain with the CEO. Moreover, we have also observed that 
CEO duality is negatively related to corporate efficiency. The evidence implies that an independent 
board can put the board at a more advantageous bargaining position to replace an inefficient CEO and 
enhance corporate efficiency. However, our result also shows that CEO duality has a weakly positive 
relationship with ROA. The empirical evidence proved that CEO duality is a double-edged sword 
regarding financial performance (Firth et al., 2014). Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) proved that CEO 
turnover appears to be more sensitive to performance when the board is more independent. CEO 
duality makes it difficult to replace inefficient CEOs, while it strengthens a valuable board when the 
CEO performs well. By comparing the coefficients, the negative relationship is much stronger, 
implying that firms should be cautious regarding board composition and refrain from CEO duality 
when the CEO performs inefficiently. 
As for the gender diversity of the board, the percentage of women on the board has no significant 
relationship with corporate efficiency. However, we found that the percentage of women on the board 
has a very strong positive linkage with ROA and market value. The coefficients are much greater than 
all the other activity variables. The positive relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance has been proven by many other empirical results (Post and Byron, 2015). Our result is 
also consistent with the findings of Terjesen et al. (2016), who investigated 3800 global companies. 
There is little doubt that women on the board is the right direction and benefits female employees 
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realizing their potential, as well as eliminating gender discrimination in the workplace. 
We also observed that audit committee meetings have a significant but extremely weak negative 
relationship with ROA. A business ethics policy for non-management or executive employees has no 
significant relationship with financial performance. Although ethical guidelines for employees are 
good practice, the effectiveness is limited if the policy is only implemented with nonexecutive 
employees. According to the discussion above, several activities regarding global sustainable strategies 
and board composition are positively related to CFP. The results support hypothesis 4, which states the 
positive effects of an independent and diversified board. Moreover, we also conclude that the United 
Nations Global Compact Signatory has a positive effect on corporate efficiency. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Control variables 
R&D expenditure is only significantly and positively associated with corporate efficiency. For ROA 
and market value, the coefficients of R&D expenditure are not statistically different from 0, which is 
consistent with the findings of Lee et al.(2016). Different from accounting- and market-based 
indicators, the corporate efficiency estimated by DEA methods is a total-factor productivity indicator, 
reflecting the technology of production and operations. R&D is the source of technological 
advancement. Thus, R&D expenditure is supposed to be directly related to the firm’s productivity. 
Firm size is positively associated with corporate efficiency and ROA, while having a nonpositive 
relationship with market value. Financial leverage is only positively related to corporate efficiency and 
negatively related to ROA and market value. From the perspective of accounting, high financial 
leverage brings about high risk, which may deteriorate profitability and market value (Opler and 
Titman, 2009). For the three specifications of the environmental, social and governance activity 
analyses, the control variables present consistent results. 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
In this study, we applied the DEA model to estimate corporate efficiency, a comprehensive CFP 
indicator, and then investigated the nonlinear relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG 
disclosure given different disclosure levels. We further explored the relationship of CFP, including 
corporate efficiency, ROA and market value, with environmental, social and governance activities.  
Based on these analyses, we found that a moderate disclosure level of ESG information has a 
significant and positive effect on corporate efficiency, in contrast to the high or low disclosure level. 
To be specific, corporate efficiency and ESG disclosure have a positive relationship at the middle 
disclosure level, where most observations occur. Among the different disclosures, governance 
disclosure has the strongest positive relationship, followed by social disclosure and environmental 
disclosure. On the other hand, a low disclosure level has a negative association with corporate 
efficiency, except for environmental information disclosure, which reveals a weak positive relationship 
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with corporate efficiency. A high disclosure level also has a negative association with corporate 
efficiency, especially environmental disclosure. These results imply that the discretionary-based 
disclosure of ESG information has a complex association with corporate efficiency, rather than a 
simple linear relationship, given internal and external circumstances.  
Furthermore, various kinds of CSR activities have been initiated to enhance corporate sustainability 
in the aspects of environmental, social and governance issues. Evidence from global companies proved 
that most of the ESG activities have non-negative relationships with corporate efficiency, ROA and 
market value. With respect to environmental activities, policies that are cost cutting, such as a green 
building policy, sustainable packaging, an environmental supply chain or adoption of independent 
assessment, are positively related to CFP. No significant results are found between climate change 
policies and CFP. For social activities, firms that try to reduce demographic discrimination and offer 
training programs equally tend to outperform their peers. In terms of governance activities, 
independent directors play an important role in reducing agency costs and maximizing shareholder 
value, which lead to better financial performance. Including women on the board also has a strong 
positive relationship with financial performance. Moreover, firms that participate in the United Nations 
Global Compact Signatory tend to be more efficient. 
Overall, though mixed relationships are found in our results, the evidence shows that there is no 
doubt about the positive association between corporate efficiency and corporate sustainability for both 
ESG information disclosures and ESG activities. The nonlinear regression results clarify the complex 
relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG information disclosure. The ESG activity analyses 
indicate common features of activities that are positively related to CFP.  
Based on our analyses, we make the following policy recommendations. First, firms are encouraged 
to disclose environmental and social information at a moderate level. Currently, corporate governance 
still plays the most important role in corporate management, rather than environmental and social 
issues. To enhance market competitiveness, disclosing more governance information is strongly 
recommended. Meanwhile, environmental and social information disclosure needs more managerial 
discretion. Firms that try little to disclose environmental and social information at a low disclosure 
level may face the resistance of poor CFP and fall into the low disclosure level and low efficiency trap. 
Our results suggest that one step forward will potentially make a difference. A strategic and moderate 
disclosure can enhance corporate efficiency, rather than a pro forma disclosure with limited 
transparency or over disclosure with much unfavorable information.  
Second, the effective execution of ESG activities is essential to both CSR performance and CFP. 
According to the guidance on ESG-related risks published by COSO and the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)  (COSO-WBCSD, 2018), in the business world, the 
awareness of ESG-related risks that were once considered as uncommon issues is becoming stronger 
than ever. However, firms can only symbolically conform to some environmental policies, such as 
climate change-related policies, without actual efforts to pursue the environmental goals (Haque and 
Ntim, 2018). Our results suggest that such climate change-related policies are also not beneficial from 
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the perspective of financial performance. In the future, to reduce or remove the impact of ESG-related 
risks and capture the potential profit opportunities, firms need to make more effort and be more 
effective in execution. 
Third, the success of industry leaders can accelerate the spread of effective CSR strategies. Due to 
budget constraints, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may spend less R&D expenditure on 
ESG activities, especially on environmental issues, which need a large investment. From this aspect, 
industry leaders are in an advantageous position to try and determine effective CSR strategies, and 
SMEs could benefit from the spillover effect. Furthermore, government or nongovernment 
organizations can also help to strengthen industrial associations by holding workshops or seminars to 
increase the collaboration between firms that face similar ESG issues. 
Further research should explore the causal relationship between CSR strategies and CFP to clarify 
what types of efforts firms can engage in to enhance CFP by doing good. Moreover, the response to 
CSR activities from stakeholders is also an important factor that might influence the CSR strategy 
choice of individual firms. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Variables #Obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 6,631 0.0020 251,605 1,943 8,001 
Employee (person) 6,631 2 2,200,000 13,678 46,938 
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 6,631 0.0001 365,086 3,142 11,999 
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 6,631 0.0009 485,651 4,378 15,248 
ESG score 6,615 2 83 22 13 
E score 3,618 1 94 22 16 
S score 4,389 3 91 27 15 
G score 6,615 9 75 48 7 
Notes: For estimating the corporate efficiency score more precisely, we selected the sample size as large as possible. After dropping missing values, the observations 
for the nonparametric regression analysis are less than the sample size for the corporate efficiency estimation. The statistical description for each sector is shown in 
Appendix Table 1.      
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Table 2. Descriptions of ESG Activities 
Environmental Activities Description 
Verification Type Indicates whether the company's environmental policies were subject to an independent assessment for the reporting period. 
Green Building Policy 
Indicates whether the company has taken any steps towards using environmental technologies and/or environmental principles in 
the design and construction of its buildings. 
Sustainable Packaging Indicates whether the company has taken any steps to make its packaging more environmentally friendly. 
Environmental Quality 
Management Policy 
Indicates whether the company has introduced any kind of environmental quality management and/or environmental 
management system to help reduce the environmental footprint of its operations. 
Environmental Supply Chain 
Management 
Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to reduce the environmental footprint of its supply chain. 
Environmental footprint reductions could be achieved by reducing waste, by reducing resource use, by reducing environmental 
emissions, by insisting on the introduction of environmental management systems, etc. in the supply chain. 
Climate Change Policy 
Indicates whether the company has outlined its intention to help reduce global emissions of the Greenhouse Gases that cause 
climate change through its ongoing operations and/or the use of its products and services. 
Climate Change Opportunities 
Discussed 
Indicates whether the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and its equivalent section of the company's annual report 
discusses business opportunities related to climate change. 
Risks of Climate Change 
Discussed 
Indicates whether the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and its equivalent section of the company's annual report 
discusses business risks related to climate change. 
Emissions Reduction Initiatives Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to reduce its environmental emissions to air 
New Products - Climate Change 
Indicates whether the company has developed and/or launched products, during the current period only, which address future 
impacts of climate change and/or which mitigate customers' contributions to climate change by reduced Green House Gas (GHG) 
emissions. The products may or may not be new to the market. 
Energy Efficiency Policy Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to make its use of energy more efficient. 
Social Activities Description 
Equal Opportunity Policy 
Indicates whether the company has made a proactive commitment to ensure non-discrimination against any type of demographic 
group. 
Human Rights Policy Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to ensure the protection of the rights of all people it works with. 
Training Policy 
Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to train new and existing employees on career development, 
education or skills. Training initiatives should apply to all employee levels, not just to those employees at management level. 
Employee CSR Training Discloses whether the company conducts training courses for employees on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Health and Safety Policy 
Indicates whether the company has recognized its health and safety risks and responsibilities and is making any effort to improve 
the management of employee health and/or employee safety. 
Fair Remuneration Policy 
Indicates if the company has demonstrated a group wide commitment to ensure payment of a fair (could be defined as minimum, 
living, or some other criteria) wage to all Group employees, even in those countries that do not legally require a minimum wage. 
Governance Activities Description 
UN Global Compact Signatory Indicates whether the company is a signatory of the United Nations Global Compact. 
GRI Criteria Compliance Indicates whether the company is in compliance with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) criteria. 
Global Reporting Initiatives 
Checked 
Indicates whether the company's application level was checked by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
% Independent Directors Independent directors as a percentage of total board membership. 
CEO Duality Indicates whether the company's Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of the Board, as reported by the company. 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Number of meetings of the Board's Audit Committee during the reporting period. In the case of Japanese companies, this number 
will reflect the number of audit committee meetings for those companies with a committee based structure, or the number of 
board of auditor meetings for those companies with a board of auditor based structure. 
% Women on Board Percentage of women on the Board of Directors, as reported by the company. 
Executive Compensation Linked 
to ESG 
Indicates whether executive compensation is linked to environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals. 
Business Ethics Policy 
Indicates whether the company has established ethical guidelines and/or a compliance policy for its non-management/executive 
employees in the conduct of company business. 
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Table 3. Piecewise Linear Fitting Result of Corporate Efficiency and ESG Disclosure score 
Piecewise Interval of 
ESG Disclosure Score 
Coefficient 
ESG score E score S score G score 
[1]    0~25 
-0.0010* 
(0.0006) 
0.0034*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0167* 
(0.0088) 
[2]   25~50 
0.0055*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0013** 
(0.0006) 
0.0037*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0051*** 
(0.0007) 
[3]   50~75 
-0.0002 
(0.0021) 
0.0003 
(0.0017) 
-0.0007 
(0.0014 
0.0104*** 
(0.0009) 
[4]  75~100 
-0.0200*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0090** 
(0.0041) 
0.0123 
(0.0100) 
(Omitted) 
RD 
0.0072*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0068*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0007) 
Firm size 
-0.0033 
(0.0023) 
0.0246*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0191*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0068*** 
(0.0022) 
Leverage 
0.0373*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0409*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0384*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0357*** 
(0.0031) 
Sector YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.2854 0.346 0.3166 0.3048 
#Obs. 6,424 3,552 4,284 6,424 
Coefficient Equality Test F-statistics 
[1] – [2] 46.91*** 3.35* 32.66*** 6.03** 
[2] – [3] 5.97** 0.26 6.6** 17.02*** 
[3] – [4] 4.08** 3.22* 1.55 (Omitted) 
Notes: The disclosure scores are quartered into four equal splines, named low disclosure level [1], lower-middle disclosure level [2], upper-middle disclosure level 
[3] and high disclosure level [4]. The first part of the table shows the result of the piecewise linear regression. The second part of the table lists the result of the 
coefficient equality test for each adjacent spline. Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4. Relationships between environmental activities and corporate efficiency, ROA and Market Value 
Variables Corporate Efficiency ROA Market Value 
Verification Type 
0.042*** 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.082** 
(0.036) 
Green Building Policy 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.015 
(0.033) 
Sustainable Packaging 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.082** 
(0.033) 
Environmental Quality Management Policy 
-0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.116*** 
(0.028) 
Environmental Supply Chain Management 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.029) 
Climate Change Policy 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.032) 
Climate Change Opportunities Discussed 
0.008 
(0.029) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.146 
(0.107) 
Risks of Climate Change Discussed 
0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
0.017 
(0.033) 
Emissions Reduction Initiatives 
0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.052 
(0.038) 
New Products - Climate Change 
-0.001 
(0.028) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.095) 
Energy Efficiency Policy 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.044) 
R&D Expenditure 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Firm Size 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.034*** 
(0.010) 
Leverage 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
-0.127*** 
(0.016) 
Sector YES YES YES 
Country YES YES YES 
#Obs. 3,604 3,393 3,560 
R2 0.440 0.133 0.371 
Notes: The table shows how environmental activities are related to corporate efficiency, ROA and Market Value. The significance levels are indicated as follows: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5. Relationships between social activities and corporate efficiency, ROA and Market Value 
Variables Efficiency ROA Market Value 
Equal Opportunity Policy 
0.043*** 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.050* 
(0.029) 
Human Rights Policy 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.064** 
(0.030) 
Training Policy 
0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.058* 
(0.033) 
Employee CSR Training 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.020 
(0.036) 
Health and Safety Policy 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.040 
(0.036) 
Fair Remuneration Policy 
0.006 
(0.043) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.141 
(0.144) 
R&D Expenditure 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Firm Size 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
Leverage 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
-0.117*** 
(0.016) 
Sector YES YES YES 
Country YES YES YES 
#Obs. 3,677 3,451 3,629 
R2 0.435 0.129 0.367 
Notes: The table shows how social activities are related to corporate efficiency, ROA and Market Value. The significance levels are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6. Relationships between governance activities and corporate efficiency, ROA and Market Value 
Variables Efficiency ROA Market Value 
UN Global Compact Signatory 
0.029* 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.044 
(0.041) 
GRI Criteria Compliance 
0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.029) 
Global Reporting Initiatives Checked 
-0.058 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
-0.232 
(0.293) 
% Independent Directors 
0.118*** 
(0.037) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.258** 
(0.113) 
CEO Duality 
-0.015* 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.004) 
Audit Committee Meetings 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.001*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.029) 
% Women on Board 
0.061 
(0.048) 
0.051*** 
(0.017) 
0.597*** 
(0.172) 
Executive Compensation Linked to ESG 
0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.048) 
Business Ethics Policy 
0.020 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.031 
(0.074) 
R&D Expenditure 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Firm Size 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
Leverage 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.081*** 
(0.019) 
Sector YES YES YES 
Country YES YES YES 
#Obs. 2,443 2,287 2,426 
R2 0.447 0.186 0.345 
Notes: The table shows how governance activities are related to corporate efficiency, ROA and Market Value. The significance levels are indicated as 
follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. Research framework of this study
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Notes: Corporate efficiency of 11 sectors is estimated by using the input-oriented DEA model. The efficiency score ranges from 0, indicating the least efficient to 
1, indicating the most efficient. Given a sector’s heterogeneity, we estimated the efficiency score by sector. Most observations come from the U.S. (2030 Obs.), 
Japan (1908 Obs.) and China (1042 Obs.). 
Figure 2. Corporate Efficiency by Sectors 
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Notes: The figures present nonparametric regression results between corporate efficiency and ESG score (a, Obs. =6556), Environmental (b, Obs. =3618), Social 
(c, Obs. =4389), Governance (d, Obs. =6615) disclosure scores, respectively. The disclosure score ranges from 0.1 to 100 and 100 points indicates full disclosure 
of all the ESG items. Corporate efficiency ranges from 0 to 1, and 1 point is the best.  
Figure 3. Relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG scores  
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Appendix 
Table S1. Descriptive statistics of financial variables and ESG disclosure scores by sectors 
Sectors (# of firms) Variables Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Energy 
(342) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 4.64  251,605  8,127  23,971  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.02  222,739  6,422  22,902  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.01  264,960  7,765  26,154  
Materials 
(776) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.00  61,278  2,149  4,952  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.35  166,982  2,784  8,004  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.13  170,497  3,403  8,819  
Industrials 
(1475) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.08  54,095  1,100  3,238  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.15  122,721  2,916  8,210  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.51  135,069  3,730  9,990  
Consumer Discretionary 
(1299) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.08  77,497  1,323  5,127  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.58  199,680  3,313  12,592  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 3.55  248,983  4,657  15,840  
Consumer Staples 
(558) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.00  116,655  1,612  5,879  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.03  365,086  5,010  19,391  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.00  485,651  7,053  25,492  
Health Care 
(565) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.04  18,479  646  1,953  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.00  167,634  2,670  12,665  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.21  179,045  4,319  15,420  
Financials 
(46) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.06  145,166  4,673  21,907  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 3.93  157,051  4,738  23,103  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 3.30  210,821  7,041  30,945  
Information Technology 
(1115) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.04  31,858  493  2,099  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.02  140,089  1,779  7,540  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.04  233,715  2,754  11,188  
Telecommunication Services 
(82) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 2.79  124,450  9,427  20,959  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 24.19  67,046  6,584  14,106  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 46.99  146,801  12,990  27,618  
Utilities 
(192) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.75  75,709  8,719  13,664  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.33  47,151  2,561  5,331  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.30  51,055  4,623  7,666  
Real Estate 
(181) 
Net Fixed Assets (million U.S. dollar) 0.23  44,883  3,413  6,913  
Employee (person) 2  95,498  7,616  15,825  
COGS (million U.S. dollar) 0.16  28,122  1,860  3,842  
Revenue (million U.S. dollar) 0.93  31,270  2,552  4,878  
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Table S2. Descriptive statistics of environmental activities variables 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variables Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value 
 0.448 0.030 0.131  0.261 0.085 0.799  0.013 -2.373 -5.625  1 0.431 3.405 
Independent & Control variables Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
R&D Expenditure 1.544 1.596 1.560  7.735 7.952 7.781  0 0 0  151.094 151.094 151.094 
Firm Size 8.536 8.562 8.543  1.606 1.597 1.605  2.079 2.079 2.079  14.604 14.604 14.604 
Leverage 0.010 0.034 0.013  0.960 0.945 0.958  -4.459 -4.459 -4.459  6.175 6.175 6.175 
Verification Type 0.124 0.128 0.125  0.329 0.334 0.331  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Green Building Policy 0.714 0.723 0.713  0.452 0.448 0.452  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Sustainable Packaging 0.168 0.169 0.169  0.374 0.374 0.375  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Environmental Quality Management 
Policy 
0.561 0.571 0.560 
 
0.496 0.495 0.497 
 
0 0 0 
 
1 1 1 
Environmental Supply Chain 
Management 
0.563 0.571 0.564 
 
0.496 0.495 0.496 
 
0 0 0 
 
1 1 1 
Climate Change Policy 0.006 0.007 0.006  0.080 0.082 0.080  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Climate Change Opportunities Discussed 0.081 0.082 0.082  0.273 0.274 0.274  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Risks of Climate Change Discussed 0.011 0.011 0.011  0.102 0.102 0.103  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Emissions Reduction Initiatives 0.779 0.788 0.779  0.415 0.409 0.415  0 0 0  1 1 1 
New Products - Climate Change 0.146 0.146 0.147  0.353 0.354 0.354  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Energy Efficiency Policy 0.376 0.380 0.378  0.484 0.486 0.485  0 0 0  1 1 1 
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Table S3. Descriptive statistics of social activities variables 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variables Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value 
 0.448 0.030 0.135  0.261 0.085 0.801  0.013 -2.373 -5.625  1.000 0.431 3.405 
Independent & Control variables Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
R&D Expenditure 1.532 1.585 1.549  7.668 7.894 7.717  0 0 0  151.094 151.094 151.094 
Firm Size 8.522 8.550 8.530  1.610 1.603 1.609  2.079 2.079 2.079  14.604 14.604 14.604 
Leverage 0.012 0.037 0.016  0.964 0.951 0.964  -4.459 -4.459 -4.459  6.175 6.175 6.175 
Health and Safety Policy 0.811 0.812 0.811  0.391 0.391 0.392  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Equal Opportunity Policy 0.623 0.619 0.625  0.485 0.486 0.484  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Human Rights Policy 0.617 0.624 0.614  0.486 0.485 0.487  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Training Policy 0.748 0.757 0.746  0.434 0.429 0.435  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Employee CSR Training 0.092 0.096 0.093  0.290 0.295 0.291  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Fair Remuneration Policy 0.005 0.006 0.005  0.072 0.074 0.072  0 0 0  1 1 1 
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Table S4. Descriptive statistics of governance activities variables 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variables Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value  Efficiency ROA Market Value 
 0.490 0.033 0.048  0.255 0.075 0.770  0.018 -1.218 -5.625  1 0.346 3.210 
Independent & Control variables Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
R&D Expenditure 1.855 1.916 1.865  8.340 8.591 8.368  0 0 0  125.4 125.4 125.4 
Firm Size 8.709 8.726 8.710  1.592 1.593 1.594  2.303 2.303 2.303  14.604 14.604 14.604 
Leverage 0.066 0.090 0.070  0.951 0.942 0.951  -3.908 -3.908 -3.908  6.175 6.175 6.175 
GRI Criteria Compliance 0.291 0.299 0.291  0.455 0.458 0.454  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Global Reporting Initiatives Checked 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.061 0.063 0.061  0 0 0  1 1 1 
UN Global Compact Signatory 0.116 0.117 0.116  0.320 0.321 0.321  0 0 0  1 1 1 
% Independent Directors 0.471 0.459 0.471  0.292 0.290 0.292  0 0 0  1 1 1 
% Women on Board 0.110 0.108 0.110  0.120 0.119 0.119  0 0 0  0.667 0.667 0.667 
Audit Committee Meetings 0.498 0.500 0.498  0.500 0.500 0.500  0 0 0  1 1 1 
CEO Duality 8.882 8.963 8.901  4.600 4.662 4.602  1 1 1  41 41 41 
Business Ethics Policy 0.862 0.860 0.865  0.345 0.347 0.342  0 0 0  1 1 1 
Executive Compensation Linked to ESG 0.071 0.070 0.071  0.257 0.256 0.257  0 0 0  1 1 1 
 
 
